Previous research indicates a non-monotonic effect of managerial shareholding on various issues, such as firm value, earnings quality, and debt costs. These studies tend to explain non-linearity in terms of convergence of interests and managerial entrenchment, and use non-linear specifications of managerial shareholding, such as piecewise variables, to capture the countervailing effects. However, such research has been criticized for its arbitrary construction of piecewise variables. This study examines the link between managerial shareholding and misreporting by disentangling shareholding into monetary incentives and control rights, captured using CEO stock delta and voting premium, respectively. Consistent with alignment of interests and managerial entrenchment, it provides consistent evidence that CEOs’ monetary incentives regarding shareholding are negatively associated, whereas CEOs’ voting rights are positively associated with a propensity to misreport. Further analysis indicates that managerial entrenchment arises because owner-CEOs create more favorable conditions for misreporting via the board selection process. Overall, the findings confirm the well-known non-monotonic effect of managerial shareholding with new evidence and additional insights. In particular, the results provide greater assurance of non-linearity in managerial shareholding by revealing its underlying mechanisms without using conventional piecewise variables.