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한국국방연구원> Korean journal of defense analysis> The Spurious Nuclear Learning: Why Nixon Used Nuclear Coercion during the Vietnam War

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The Spurious Nuclear Learning: Why Nixon Used Nuclear Coercion during the Vietnam War

Myung Chul Kim
  • : 한국국방연구원
  • : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권4호
  • : 연속간행물
  • : 2020년 12월
  • : 583-599(17pages)

DOI


목차

Introduction
Nuclear Learning and Diverse Nuclear Attitudes
Nuclear Coercive Diplomacy during the Vietnam War
Differences in Nuclear Usability Attitude between U.S. Presidents Johnson and Nixon
Nixon’s Spurious Nuclear Learning
Conclusion
Notes
Notes on Contributor

키워드 보기


초록 보기

Because the existing nuclear theories overlook leaders’ historically diverse preferences about how to use nuclear weapons, they cannot adequately explain why the United States used nuclear coercion at all against weak states or for non-vital national interests when the United States had superior conventional forces. I argue that while U.S. leaders’ learning of the overly destructive damage of military nuclear use raised the threshold of using nuclear weapons to attack, the lack of learning or biased learning of the repercussions of coercive nuclear use allowed many leaders to retain their belief in the coercive power of nuclear weapons. Drawing on theoretical concepts of nuclear learning and historical analysis, this paper explains how U.S. leaders’ spurious learning of the political reality of nuclear weapons led them to the counterproductive use of nuclear coercion. The historical analysis shows that President Richard Nixon was more willing to use nuclear coercion to end the Vietnam War than other leaders like President Lyndon Johnson. Nixon derived his nuclear strategy, represented by his “madman theory,” from his observation of atomic diplomacy during the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, though Nixon’s learning seemed to be fairly spurious as the role of nuclear coercive diplomacy in ending the War and Crisis is still highly debatable.

UCI(KEPA)

I410-ECN-0102-2021-300-001253413

간행물정보

  • : 사회과학분야  > 정치/외교학
  • : KCI등재
  • : SSCI
  • : 계간
  • : 1016-3271
  • :
  • : 학술지
  • : 연속간행물
  • : 1989-2021
  • : 851


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1Strengthening Multi-Domain Deterrence and Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region

저자 : Richard Weitz

발행기관 : 한국국방연구원 간행물 : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권 4호 발행 연도 : 2020 페이지 : pp. 495-516 (22 pages)

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Novel strategic technologies are posing major challenges to Asian security. These disruptive systems include high-precision and hypersonic delivery vehicles, advanced cyber capabilities, and space weaponry. The proliferation of these new capabilities among states could complicate military planning, reduce strategic predictability, and decrease crisis stability by amplifying preemption incentives. Developments regarding these technologies have already contributed to the collapse of longstanding arms control agreements and have raised dangers of miscalculations or misperceptions that could lead to inadvertent escalation. Yet, revisionist powers in Asia―such as China, Russia, and North Korea―perceive these strategic technologies as helping them realize their theory of victory. In particular, they hope to employ them to negate superior U.S. conventional forces to secure important gains in a limited conflict through multi-domain coercion, while managing escalation dynamics to prevent an all-out war. Chinese, Russian, and DPRK strategists see having strong offensive capabilities as their best means of crippling U.S. military alliances in Asia. Indeed, these strike systems enhance the anti-access/ area-denial barriers these Asian land powers have erected to keep U.S. forces from reinforcing U.S. allies and partners. Fortunately, emerging strategic technologies can enhance U.S. alliances in Asia in critical ways, while some of their potentially destabilizing impacts can be mitigated by managing competition and reducing the risks of miscalculations in these domains.

2U.S. Coercive Diplomacy toward Pyongyang: Obama vs. Trump

저자 : Seong-ho Sheen

발행기관 : 한국국방연구원 간행물 : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권 4호 발행 연도 : 2020 페이지 : pp. 517-538 (22 pages)

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Since the first nuclear crisis of the early 1990s, the United States has engaged in coercive diplomacy toward North Korea for its denuclearization. From Clinton to Trump, it has consumed four U.S. administrations without much success so far. Meanwhile, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests and tested intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of which created serious tensions on the Korean Peninsula, with potential military actions. After a war of words with military threats in much of 2017, Kim Jong Un and President Trump had their first historic meeting in Singapore in June 2018 followed by two more in Hanoi and Panmunjom in 2019. Although no one is sure about their final negotiation outcome, the U.S. nuclear negotiation with North Korea presents an interesting case of coercive diplomacy spanning over a quarter century. The puzzle is, despite its willingness to engage North Korea from early on, the Obama administration did not have meaningful success in nuclear diplomacy while the Trump administration did have at least a first-ever summit with the North Korean leader. Why, then, has Obama's diplomatic efforts failed to achieve major nuclear agreement with Pyongyang? Can the Trump administration's coercive diplomacy finally succeed in getting Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons? What are the conditions for the effective use of pressure? Are appropriate rewards needed alongside pressure? Using the works of Alexander George and Bruce Jentleson on coercive diplomacy theory, this paper draws on analyses and lessons from U.S. efforts to persuade North Korea to denuclearize its weapons program by the Obama and the Trump administrations.

3Changes in U.S. Security and Defense Strategy toward China: Assessment and Policy Implications

저자 : Kijoo Kim

발행기관 : 한국국방연구원 간행물 : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권 4호 발행 연도 : 2020 페이지 : pp. 539-560 (22 pages)

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This study analyzes American defense and security strategy towards China and assesses its policy impact on security on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The rapid rise of the People's Republic of China as a geopolitical power and its aggressive foreign policy has considerably heightened fears among U.S. policymakers that China poses a threat. The intensifying strategic rivalry and distrust between Washington and Beijing since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump in 2017 is leading to worsened relations between the two countries. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and it is also expected that the American grand strategy will view China as the new global adversary, drawing down the “War on Terror” in the process. China is indeed fast emerging as the target of sustained deterrence, and this shift in American strategic thinking will likely continue even after the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. Intensifying Sino-American geopolitical competition is resulting in a new Cold War posture, reflecting in turn a lack of strategic dialogue. As a result, the risk of Sino-American military conflict in geopolitical hotspots around the world (including the Korean Peninsula) is rapidly increasing, and countries in the region are worried about being entangled in a Great Power conflict between the two countries. In the meantime, the United States is soliciting countries in the region to join an “anti-Beijing” grouping of sorts, seeking to integrate pre-existing alliances (e.g., the ROK-U.S. Alliance) into this new grouping. Beijing, for its part, is attempting to weaken those traditional alliances with Washington, through measures such as economic coercion. Seoul is bearing the brunt of such sustained pressure from Beijing and is being pressured by both countries to “pick” one side over the other. Practically speaking, rather than pick sides, Seoul ought to chart a middle course, proceeding with “strategic confidence” that draws on a clear delineation of national interest and backing of the South Korean public. In particular, it would behoove Seoul to provide opportunities for deliberation on Korean Peninsula security issues, enhancing the prospects for meaningful strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Concurrently, Seoul would also benefit from vigilant monitoring of the changing balance of power between United States and China, utilizing insights drawn from keen monitoring to further enhance its defense capabilities. In so doing, it is expected that Seoul will enhance its strategic value and military deterrence capabilities. Concurrently, by way of proactive military-to-military diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, cooperative deterrence capabilities also would have to be significantly enhanced.

4Whither North Korea? Competing Historical Analogies and the Lessons of the Soviet Case

저자 : Taesuh Cha

발행기관 : 한국국방연구원 간행물 : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권 4호 발행 연도 : 2020 페이지 : pp. 561-582 (22 pages)

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Two years ago, the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington remarkably changed from hair-triggering military tension to unprecedented rounds of summits. However, those diplomatic overtures suddenly fell away again over the course of 2019-2020. How can we understand this spectacular shift in the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula? What kinds of solutions can we (re-)try amid a long post-Hanoi impasse in nuclear talk? With the Trump presidency coming to an end, it is high time to look back on what really happened in this turbulent international drama, in an attempt to explain the serpentine trajectory of the Korean conundrum. In this context, I ask if mapping competing historical analogies can shed light on our understanding of the potential U.S.-DPRK rapprochement. Each mainstream political force in the Republic of Korea has mobilized contrasting historical reference points as heuristics to analyze the changing relations between America and North Korea, as well as to construct policy options to respond to them. There are competing discourses related to specific historical events, such as the Munich Agreement of 1938, the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, and Gorbachev's “New Thinking.” In the near future, we will see if the North Korean supreme leader is a Gorbachev initiating fundamental reforms or a Hitler who exploits idealistic appeasement moves. Thus, the series of summit conferences between Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang in 2018-2019 will be remembered as a crucial watershed in the long history of the East Asian Cold War, similar to the Gorbachev-Reagan period during the Cold War in Europe.

5The Spurious Nuclear Learning: Why Nixon Used Nuclear Coercion during the Vietnam War

저자 : Myung Chul Kim

발행기관 : 한국국방연구원 간행물 : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권 4호 발행 연도 : 2020 페이지 : pp. 583-599 (17 pages)

다운로드

(기관인증 필요)

초록보기

Because the existing nuclear theories overlook leaders' historically diverse preferences about how to use nuclear weapons, they cannot adequately explain why the United States used nuclear coercion at all against weak states or for non-vital national interests when the United States had superior conventional forces. I argue that while U.S. leaders' learning of the overly destructive damage of military nuclear use raised the threshold of using nuclear weapons to attack, the lack of learning or biased learning of the repercussions of coercive nuclear use allowed many leaders to retain their belief in the coercive power of nuclear weapons. Drawing on theoretical concepts of nuclear learning and historical analysis, this paper explains how U.S. leaders' spurious learning of the political reality of nuclear weapons led them to the counterproductive use of nuclear coercion. The historical analysis shows that President Richard Nixon was more willing to use nuclear coercion to end the Vietnam War than other leaders like President Lyndon Johnson. Nixon derived his nuclear strategy, represented by his “madman theory,” from his observation of atomic diplomacy during the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, though Nixon's learning seemed to be fairly spurious as the role of nuclear coercive diplomacy in ending the War and Crisis is still highly debatable.

6Trilateral Trade and Taking a Side Between the U.S. and China

저자 : Wonjae Hwang , Randy Willemain , Sang-hwan Lee

발행기관 : 한국국방연구원 간행물 : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권 4호 발행 연도 : 2020 페이지 : pp. 601-623 (23 pages)

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Does China's growing economic power generate political influence over its economic partners' foreign policies? Does this tendency, if it exists, occur at the expense of U.S. interests on those issues? Since China and the U.S. maintain extremely opposing positions over diverse foreign policy issues, it is important to explore these questions. In the analysis of panel data on trilateral trade for China and the U.S. between 1991 and 2014, our empirical results show that China's trade partners are likely to vote alongside it but against the U.S., even on human rights or important issues identified by the U.S. government in the UN General Assembly. In both cases, as the relative size of trade with China in comparison to the size of trade with the U.S. increases, a state tends to vote alongside China rather than the U.S. The findings imply that growing policy cooperation between China and its trade partners comes at the expense of U.S. national interests and its leadership to a great extent.

7Sino-DPRK Relations and Chinese Perception toward North Korea's Nuclear Issue: Meta-Analysis on Chinese Literature since 2012

저자 : Haofan Fang

발행기관 : 한국국방연구원 간행물 : Korean journal of defense analysis 32권 4호 발행 연도 : 2020 페이지 : pp. 625-653 (29 pages)

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This paper examined the perceptions of Chinese scholars on Sino-DPRK relations and North Korea's nuclear issue through meta-analysis of arguments of 102 articles published from January 2012 to June 2020. As a result of a comprehensive investigation, this paper found six main tendencies on Chinese academic discourse. First, although Sino-DPRK relations became strained at times, most articles viewed it as a friendly alliance and a special relationship. Some also argue that it should be transformed into normal diplomatic relations between sovereign states. Second, while acknowledging North Korea's role as a strategic buffer, Chinese scholars tend to believe that Pyongyang's nuclear program not only threatens China's national security and interests but also allows the United States to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance and implement strategic deterrence against Beijing. Third, in many scholars' predictions, the North's nuclear weapons are likely to cause nuclear proliferation and an arms race in East Asia. Fourth, scholars claim that the North's nuclear issue stem not only from the Cold War but also from the post-Cold War architecture on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, some of them support the North's nuclear development, emphasizing a Korean unification led by Pyongyang, a strategic balance between the two Koreas, and lessons from the Indian and Iraqi cases. Fifth, most papers find the root cause of Pyongyang's nuclear development as being from U.S. military threats, yet the authors think situational changes made the North's nuclear policy more entrenched. Sixth, the authors stressed Sino-U.S. cooperation is necessary to resolve nuclear issue, criticizing the lack of Washington's sincerity. They expect Beijing to play an active role in this problem based on its special relationship with Pyongyang despite some limitations.

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