China-U.S. relations have entered a downward spiral. The structural conflict between China and the United States is related to how the two countries view the new world order in the future. This article tries to explore the roots and essence of the United States' perception of China, discuss how China views the future world order, and analyze the risks of U.S. behavior toward China and China's propositions and claims for the future world order.

What factors determine the success and failure of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)? What factors and conditions enhance the effectiveness of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation regimes? Does correlation exist between the regime effectiveness and the great power's support for the said regimes? If so, under what circumstances does the great power support or reject regimes?
This study seeks to identify the determinants of the success and failure of nonproliferation regime of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) under the U.N. system. The international efforts to ensure the life and safety of mankind from WMD have led to create 19 WMD nonproliferation regimes starting with the Geneva Protocol in 1925. Among 19 WMD nonproliferation regimes, only four regimes (CWC, INF, NPT, IAEA) have strong implementation power and are considered successful while five regimes (PTBT, Tlatelolco, CTBTO, IND NNT, Pelindaba) have not been ratified by states parties and thus have not gone into effect.
Case studies of successful regimes and failed regimes reveal the factors that enhance the regime's ability to implement, and illustrate why the great power selectively supports or rejects particular regimes and helps strengthen the implementation. This study reveals the factors that impel the great power to support or reject the nonproliferation regime of WMD, which can be a very useful tool to evaluate the regime's effectiveness and predict the future of regimes.
By comparing successful cases of the CWC with failures of the BWC, this research asserts that four determinants influence the great power's decision to support or reject regimes: 'non-restraint,' economic interests, the technology gap, and bargaining. Regardless of the counterparts' aims and the type of weapon, the great power provides full support to strengthen the effectiveness of a regime that i) will not constrain its freedom of behaviors; ii) will enhance economic interests; iii) concerns the field where there is a relatively narrow technology gap between the great power and regional powers; and iv) necessitates bargaining with regional powers to garner support.
The implications of this study can be applied to the BWC, which remains weak in responding to North Korea's biological threats on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, provided that future pandemic may not be of naturally occurring diseases but of artificial biological terrorism and deliberate attacks, measures to strengthen the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention must be urgently needed to respond to large-scale biological incidents including the next pandemic that will require transnational responses.

Why do leaders double down on wars and other unpopular foreign policies that the public opposes? Criticism of costly wars creates a dilemma for decision-makers as both maintaining and changing existing strategies have negative consequences for their prospect of remaining in office. To resolve this dilemma, leaders may opt to 'gamble for resurrection' to achieve victory. While valid, existing arguments that adopt the rationalist approach about the preference of leaders and the informative function of polls rely on narrow assumptions about decision-making. Psychological mechanisms broaden our understanding of how difficult policy choices are made. Specifically, this article contends that the psychological pressures created by the public's negative assessments of the competence of leaders constitute a threat to leaders' self-esteem, which, in turn, triggers psychological defensive mechanisms. Common defensive mechanisms, including reaction formation, isolation, and denial, make it more likely that leaders commit further to failing wars and unsuccessful foreign policies. These mechanisms are substantiated through an analysis of the Bush administration's Surge in Iraq in 2007. The article contributes to the literature by highlighting additional pathways through which public opinion impacts foreign policy decision-making, not only through electoral consequences but also through implicit signals regarding the public's views on leaders' ability to lead.

Over the past two decades, non-kinetic effects have become core to the warfare undertaken by democratic countries. International security and human rights issues are now prominently at the forefront of international discourse, and these political areas have influenced profoundly military applications of force. Accordingly, the strategic environment of warfare has shifted; military strategists are now forced to avoid lethality in warfare wherever possible. In contrast, asymmetric enemies, like international terrorist groups, have tended to show their military power. In this new paradigm, the United States and its allies are shifting military doctrines away from traditional concepts such as overwhelming force or air superiority and are seeking new ways to protect international peace without avoidable casualties and collateral damage. This study argues that non-kinetic effects-based operations will shape these new strategies in the next era of international security and human rights.

A recent study on the effect of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula argues that it will not cause instability in the country by showing that no North Korean military provocation is anticipated after the withdrawal. However, I theorize that U.S. forces reduction will, rather, create relatively more peaceful circumstances because North Korea strategically will see to avoid any instability that may stop the withdrawal, which is not North Korea's real intention. Based on this concept of strategic avoidance, this paper hypothesizes a negative relationship between U.S. force reduction and North Korean military provocation, and between the actual size of the U.S. forces and the peaceful behavior of North Korea. The result indicates that peace after force reduction can be explained by strategic avoidance, which means that temporary peace is not North Korea's genuine intention but a byproduct of its devious tactics that aim to have fewer U.S. boots on the ground.

This article aims to examine the elements of the crises and challenges of South-North Korean cooperation after the sixth nuclear test in North Korea in 2017 and to consider the possibility of South-North Korean cooperation concerning human security and the actual state of human security in North Korea in the sectors of welfare and food. Most importantly, the welfare and food sectors have become the most important issue of human security in North Korea due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These are directly connected to its survival accompanied by urgency and sensitivity. Welfare and food support are considered a matter in the field that can achieve cooperation without any strong objection from North Korea in addition to international cooperation for humanitarian purposes. If these forms of South-North Korean cooperation become possible, they could become the trigger that opens the gate of communication in the South-North Korean relationship that is fixed with chronic welfare and food problems in North Korea and the relief of the economic sanctions in North Korea as prescribed by the UN and the US. The possibility of South-North Korean exchange through enhanced human security may be expanded to the relief of North Korean sanctions for the assurance of humanitarian activity, international cooperation, and governance construction. At the same time, if South-North Korean cooperation is approached from a human security point of view, it may create momentum that results in the settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula by acting as a catalyst that could relieve the problem of welfare and food faced by North Korea and transform the hardened South-North Korean relationship into a more conversational paradigm.

This paper attempts to assess the threats from North Korea's first Hwasung-8 hypersonic missile test in 2021 and another hypersonic missile test undertaken in January 2022. Through examination of the current status, purpose, and capability of North Korea's hypersonic missile development, we evaluate the current status and threat of North Korea's hypersonic missile development and review the countermeasures of the South Korean military.
Hypersonic missiles constitute a new weapon system currently being developed in some technologically advanced countries, including the United States, Russia, and China. They are dubbed a game-changer of war because it is impossible to defend them with a general ballistic missile defense system. Thus, North Korea's hypersonic missile test was a big shock to South Korea. North Korea's development of hypersonic missiles should be established through objective evaluation of South Korea's missile defense system. Since hypersonic missiles are different from ordinary ballistic missiles in terms of their capabilities, such as speed and maneuver, it is difficult to establish a counter-defense weapon system. North Korea's development of hypersonic missiles poses a threat to South Korea's peace and security; thus, a response is needed. First, South Korea should analyze North Korea's intentions behind developing hypersonic missiles and its threats. Second, South Korea should strengthen its missile capabilities to cope with military threats from North Korea's development of hypersonic missile technology. Lastly, South Korea should surpass North Korea in the hypersonic missile development.
This study is meaningful in that it analyzed the North's hypersonic missile development and test process and its threats to South Korea and neighboring countries. It also studied countermeasures of the South Korean military. Access to information such as North Korea's hypersonic missile flight data was restricted; hence, analysis of North Korea's hypersonic missile capability was limited. Nonetheless, this study will provide substantial grounds to encourage in-depth research on North Korea's supersonic missile development in the future.

One of the most worrisome aspects of the current war on Ukraine is its possibility of escalating to a nuclear level. How likely is Moscow to employ nuclear weapons in the conflict? Is this crisis more or less likely to get worse than other nuclear crises? I try to find out some answers by looking at specific characteristics of the ongoing nuclear crisis. The paper begins with a basic framework of the nuclear crisis developed by Bell and Macdonald. Then I delve into the development and evolution of Russia's nuclear strategy. By applying Bell and Macdonald's theoretical framework to the ongoing nuclear crisis, I cautiously conclude that the current crisis is closer to the staircase model, where a nuclear first use incentive is moderate to relatively high, and crisis controllability is high. Therefore, the possibility of the current crisis escalating to a nuclear level may not be so high. There is certainly a risk of analyzing an ongoing crisis, and future research needs to address theoretical and practical shortcomings.