본 연구는 선행연구에서 다소 주목받지 못한 우리나라 기업지배구조의 현실적인 상황인 기업지배권을 둘러싸고 있는 복수의 주요대주주의 존재와 이들 사이에 지배권경쟁가능성을 반영하여 이익조정을 실증 분석하였다. 즉, 본 연구는 대부분의 선행연구에서 대주주 1인 또는 1인 지배주주에 연구 초점을 두고 있는 상황에 대한 보완으로 현실적인 기업지배구조의 특징인 지배권경쟁이 가능한 복수의 주요대주주 존재를 연구모형에 반영하였고, 이와 연계하여 기업의 이익조정 행태 차이를 실증 분석하였다. 따라서 본 연구의 차별적 특징은 기업지배구조의 현실적 측면을 반영하여 회계학의 핵심 연구주제인 이익조정 문제를 조명한 것이라 할 수 있다. 더욱이 주요대주주는 기업에서 상당한 투표권을 보유함으로써 경영자를 감시할 의지 및 능력을 가지고 있으므로 지배주주의 기회주의적 이익조정을 용이하게 막을 수 있는 능력을 갖고 있는 것으로 인식되지만, 다른 한편으로는 다른 주요대주주와 지배권연합을 형성하여 기회주의적 행동을 할 수 있다. 이러한 문제는 실증적 검증문제로 귀결되며, 본 연구의 목적은 이와 관련하여 복수의 주요대주주가 존재할 때 이익조정의 문제를 검증하고자 한다. 연구결과는 다음과 같이 요약되어진다. 주요대주주의 기회주의 행위에 대한 통제환경으로 지배권경쟁 변수의 통제(monitoring) 효과를 분석한 결과 지배권경쟁가능성이 감소하는 경우 이익조정(DA)이 증가함을 지지하는 실증증거를 제시하였고, 이는 주요대주주의 존재와 그에 따른 지배권경쟁가능성의 증가가 이익조정을 감소시킬 수 있음을 의미한다.
Recent empirical works show that ownership is typically concentrated in a small number of large shareholders. This evidences shift the focus from the traditional conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholder to an equally important agency conflict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A few large shareholders can have positive side and negative side in control. The main risk is that the large shareholders can pursue their own goals against firm`s profit maximization. Some of these goals can come at the expense of minority shareholders. But, in most studies, they have assumption there is one largest shareholder in firms. So in this paper, we address a different question: Do the multiple large shareholders have an advantage or disadvantage for minority shareholders? And we examine the role of the multiple large shareholders and the relationship contestability among them and earning management. For these purpose we derive the condition equation including multiple large shareholders contestability. In a model, multiple blockholders can have two different roles in the firms. Blockholders have the power and the incentives to monitor the largest shareholder by holding a substantial voting block, therefore they have the ability to reduce profit diversion. On the other hand, the blockholder can form a controlling coalition with other blockholders and share the diverted profit. The presenting and analyzing condition equation about earning management under circumstance with multiple blockholders and with a single blockholder is the key contribution of this paper. So we develop the hypothesis that the contestability between major shareholders has relationship with earning management and verify this by using the condition equation. To test these hypotheses, we analyse the relative voting power and the type of multiple blockholders. The sample covers non-financial Korean companies that have at least one large shareholder (with more than 5% of the votes) over the period 2005-2007. Total 758 firm-year observations are used in the regression analysis. We measure the contestability of major shareholders by using three different way(based on the Herfindahl index). First of all, we measure the sum of squares of the difference between the percentage of first major shareholder`s holdings and the second plus the sum of squares of the difference between the percentage of second major shareholder`s holdings and the third as the Hi_difference variables, the sum of squares of each holdings of the first, the second and the third major shareholder as Hi_concentrate variables. The higher these two variables are, the lower the contestability are. The Third variables is measured if the percentage of the first and the second shareholders` holdings is less than 20%, there are at least one more major shareholders then 1, else 0 as the Hi-D variables. There are advantages because the prior two variables are continuous variables, but there could be the problems of measurement errors. So we select the third dummy variables. And we measure the discretionary accruals to examine the earning management. To do this, we adopt revised Jones model(Dechow et, al., 1995)) that is generally known as the better measurement than Jones model(1991). As a result of the empirical research, we find that the contestability of the largest shareholders has a positive effect on firm earnings management that is measured by accruals. The higher the contestability, the less earning management there is. Namely, blockholders have a role to monitor the largest shareholder and protect small shareholders` wealth. We conduct additional analysis for verifying the robustness and sensitivity of the results. We reexamine the relationship of the earning management and contestability by using the earning section around “0”. We reconsider the type of blockholders (Family, Bank, Institute, Group), other earning management through real activities manipulation and the relationship with persons with a special relationship. We conduct the sensitivity analysis according to the other accruals variables, holding rate of the blockholders and the study method relating to the data. Also, we examine the endogeneity analysis to investigate a casual relationship between the earning management and the contestability. As a result of additional analysis considering the different situations and measurement problem about the variables, we can get the same conclusion at the results of the main analysis. This paper investigate the corporate governance reflecting the real and practical environment that there are blockholders over one and present mathematical model as well as the theoretical model based on the prior study. We propose the explanation of process about the relationship between the corporate governance and firms` value. This means that the accounting information is the link between the corporate governance and firms` value. So, It need to consider the contestability as well as the existence, the type, the holding rates of the blockholders in future study relating to the corporate governance.
: 사회과학분야 > 회계학
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