As a result of the remarkable developments in biotechnology and biomedicine, it has become an important issue whether an embryo in vitro should be afforded human dignity and the right of life. In Korea, ``The Law of Bioethics and Safety`` was enacted to resolve conflicts between bioethics and biotechnology. Since section 17 of the law holds that supernumerary embryos, which elapsed more than 5 years of preservations-period or fewer than 5 years of this period, if the parents give consent, can be used in research for the treatment of sterility and contraceptive measures, muscle dystrophy, or a rare or incurable disease. Two embryos, their parents and other people (law professor, philosophers, doctors, lawyer etc.) have brought constitutional complaint against the law in the Constitutional Court, for the reason why the section violates their human dignity and the embryos` right of life. In this case, the most important points are whether an embryo could be the subject of human dignity and the right of life on the one hand, and whether sections 16 and 17 of the law violate human dignity and the right of life, as the embryos and other people including their parents articulated, on the other hand. There are many theories about when human dignity and the right of life begin: from the time of fertilization, implantation, building of the brain, development of the human shape, or birth, among other time points. In my opinion, the embryo is the subject of human dignity from the time of fertilization, even before it is implanted in the mother`s womb (fertilization`s theory). Nevertheless, from the perspective of the protect-intensity of human dignity, embryos before implantation could be treated differently than the embryo after implantation. In other words, the human dignity of the embryo before implantation could be restricted by the fundamental rights of the mother like the rights of self-decision (Article 10 Constitution). 배아와 인간존엄 37 The conclusions that follow from the recognition of embryos as the subject of human dignity and the possibility of restricting dignity-protection, which the author formed in this article, are as follows: First, except for the purposes of childbirth, supernumerary embryos in vitro should not be created. Second, nevertheless, in the case of creating supernumerary embryos according to the current law, the woman should not be obligated to implantation, if the woman no longer desires pregnancy. Third, if the woman dies or has no intention for childbirth while the supernumerary embryos are being preserved, the state should search the chances of implantation like a surrogate mother, for the purpose of protecting human dignity and the right of life. If not, the state should preserve the embryos permanently in principle until it finds the possibility of implantation. Fourth, the embryo not only should not be abolished, but also should not be used for research, even if the 5-year period of preservations has passed, lest the creation of embryos for research should be legalized in practice. Fifth, so-called "somatic cell nuclear transfer embryos" are also the subject of human dignity, because they could develop into a human being, on the condition that they would be transplanted into the wombs. Therefore, the creation of somatic cell nuclear transfer embryos should not be permitted, even if they are made for therapeutic purposes. In conclusion, sections 16 and 17 of the law, which prescribe that embryos should be abolished after 5 years or less period, if the parents consent to it, to be preserved, so that they may be used for research, are unconstitutional, because they violate the human dignity clause and the rights of life for embryos in vitro.