The purpose of this study is to examine the lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and suggest strategic implications for the security of the Korean Peninsula after analyzing why Russia invaded Ukraine. In particular, the Ukraine situation is a good example of how much the strategic failure of a weak country sandwiched between the great powers will cost. The lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis for security on the Korean Peninsula are as follows. First, the Ukraine crisis can have an important learning effect for China, which is in strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, depending on how the US and Europe respond to the crisis, China’s counter-strategy to the US on Taiwan and North Korea issues will be influenced. Second, the Ukraine crisis is an example that shows the price and opportunity cost to be paid if the diplomacy between small and medium powers goes wrong. In particular, Ukraine relies on Russia for its economy and the US and Western Europe for its security, choosing one side is paying the price for not securing the means and methods to escape from the tightrope of threats and pressures expected. Third, the Ukraine crisis reminds us of the importance of national defense capabilities to protect the country from external threats. After signing the Budapest Protocol in 1994 at the request of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, including the United States and Russia, Ukraine returned all its nuclear weapons to Russia by 1996, losing its deterrent ability to respond to external military threats. In conclusion, Ukraine has recently become the arena of the great powers’ game of the 21st century. We must do our best so that the Korean Peninsula does not become a field of hegemonic competition like in the 19th century. In particular, based on a strong ROK-US alliance, we will not only solve the North Korean nuclear issue but also minimize conflicts with neighboring countries and maximize national interests.

□ 러시아와 우크라이나 간 전쟁 발발은 코로나19의 충격에서 점차 벗어나고 있는 세계경제의 회복을 지연시키고 인플레이션을 확대시키는 한편 금융시장의 불안을 초래하는 요인으로 작용할 가능성이 높음. □ 우리 경제도 전쟁의 여파로 인한 글로벌 수입수요 둔화로 수출이 감소하고 원자재 공급망이 원활하게 작동하지 않으면서 기업의 생산이 차질을 받는 등 실물경제활동이 위축될 가능성이 있음. □ 또한 최근 높은 수준을 유지하고 있는 물가오름세가 유가, 곡물 등 원자재가격의 상승으로 더욱 확대되는 한편 안전자산 선호, 변동성 확대 등으로 금융시장의 원활한 작동이 저해될 우려가 있음. □ 이에 따라 전쟁이 장기화된다면 우리 경제는 경기가 빠르게 둔화하는 반면 인플레이션은 크게 확대되는 상충적 상황에 직면할 가능성이 높아질 것으로 보임. □ 이처럼 대내외 경제여건의 불확실성이 높아지는 상황에서는 성장과 물가안정이라는 양대 정책목표를 달성하기 위한 재정정책과 통화정책의 조화로운 운용이 어느 때보다도 중요할 것으로 생각됨. □ 또한 정책당국 간의 긴밀한 공조를 통하여 최악의 상황을 가정한 비상대응전략을 마련하는 한편 금융시장과의 활발한 의사소통 채널을 가동하고 주요국 정책대응, 국제금융시장의 자금 흐름 등에 대한 모니터링을 더욱 강화할 필요가 있음.

본 연구는 현 우크라이나 사태의 핵심 당사자인 러시아의 인식과 행태에 초점을 맞춰 현 위기의 본질과 의미를 탐색한다. 특히 러시아의 인식, 추구 목표와 대응 전략을 살펴보고, 사태전개를 결정지을 핵심 변수를 도출함으로써 향후 전망의 단서를 찾는다. 또한 국제·지역 질서, 러시아, 한국, 한반도에 대한 정책적 시사점을 제시한다. 러시아는 미국과 나토가 지속적 동진을 통해 자국의 안보를 심각하게 위협한다고 본다. 따라서 이번 사태를 통해 우크라이나의 나토 가입 저지, 유럽 안보 지형 재편, 국제질서의 다극화를 목표로 설정했다. 이 같은 목표의 달성을 위해 외교적 관여 단계에서는 ‘비예측성 극대화’ 전략을, 미국과 서방의 양보를 기대할 수 없게 되자 ‘과감한 실력행사’ 전략을 구사하고 있다. 향후 사태 전개는 러시아의 우크라이나 점령 목표, 우크라이나의 저항 역량, 러시아 내 여론 동향, 강제 병합 시도 여부가 주요 변수가 될 것이다.

This study explores the nature and meaning of the current Ukraine crisis by focusing on the Russia's perceptions and behaviors of Russia. In particular, by examining Russia's perception, pursuit goals, and strategies, and deriving key variables that will determine the development of the situation, it finds clues to future prospects. It also presents policy implications for international and regional order, Russia, Korea, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia believes that the U.S. and NATO are seriously threatening their security through continuous enlargement to the east. Therefore, Moscow has set the goal of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, reorganizing the European security landscape, and multipolarizing the international order in this crisis. To achieve this goal, they are using a “maximizing non-predictability” strategy at the stage of diplomatic engagement and a “bold use of military power” strategy as concessions cannot be expected from the U.S. and the West. In the future, Russia's goal of occupying Ukraine region, Ukraine's resistance capabilities, public opinion trends in Russia, and forced annexation of occupied areas will be the main variables. In the future, the main variables will be Russia's target occupation area category, Ukraine's resistance capacity, public opinion trends in Russia, and forced merger of occupied areas.

Since 2003, the Russian-Georgian and the Russian-Ukrainian relations became worse because of pro-European policies of Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has had policy options of so-called “stick and carrots” for these two countries. In the case of Ukraine, the tensions between Russia and Ukraine has reached the peak when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 after the collapse of the Yanukovich regime. This paper tried to prove that the selection of Yanukovich as a pro-Russian presidential candidate was a deep cause of “Orange Revolution” and “Euromaidan Revolution” and, consequently, the current conflicts between Ukraine and Russia. As a contrast to this, Ivanishvili’s active participation in Georgian politics has contributed to reverse Georgia’s pro-European policy and, consequently, a peaceful relations with Russia after the South Ossetian war. It also contributed to stabilize the domestic politics since 2012. This shows that the selection of political leaders and Russia’s support for them in these two countries is as important as other policy options. The comparison of personal background, education, economic ambition, the use of financial resources, corruption of Yanukovich and Ivanishvili presents a striking contrast. This has led to a completely different political fates of both leaders and different relations with Russia. In conclusion, more than any other means, the selection and support of political leaders in near-abroad countries has a critical meaning in defining the interests of Russia in this region.