Mutual deterrence makes the risk of deliberate aggression on the Korean Peninsula quite low, but the very steps that both sides have taken to deter pre-meditated war have increased the risk of inadvertent war. For a peace treaty to be militarily meaningful, the force postures and war plans on both sides that pose an excessive risk of pre-emptive war have to be altered. That will require mutual and reciprocal, though not necessarily identical steps by both sides to defuse the volatile standoff at the DMZ. That is a demanding task, and one that is unlikely to succeed without fostering a conducive political environment first. One way to foster that environment is a series of peace agreements, as distinct from a peace treaty, that establishes a new three.way peace mechanism and develops some politically useful, though militarily less meaningful, confidencebuilding measures. Such peace agreements, in which the United States is a signatory, are a way to give the DPRK a form of diplomatic recognition, thereby facilitating a resolution of the current nuclear crisis. The September 19, 2006 joint statement gives impetus to this effort when it says “the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”

Mutual deterrence makes the risk of deliberate aggression on the Korean Peninsula quite low, but the very steps that both sides have taken to deter pre-meditated war have increased the risk of inadvertent war. For a peace treaty to be militarily meaningful, the force postures and war plans on both sides that pose an excessive risk of pre-emptive war have to be altered. That will require mutual and reciprocal, though not necessarily identical steps by both sides to defuse the volatile standoff at the DMZ. That is a demanding task, and one that is unlikely to succeed without fostering a conducive political environment first. One way to foster that environment is a series of peace agreements, as distinct from a peace treaty, that establishes a new three.way peace mechanism and develops some politically useful, though militarily less meaningful, confidencebuilding measures. Such peace agreements, in which the United States is a signatory, are a way to give the DPRK a form of diplomatic recognition, thereby facilitating a resolution of the current nuclear crisis. The September 19, 2006 joint statement gives impetus to this effort when it says “the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”