부작위라는 개념 혹은 의무라는 개념은 눈에 보이지 않는 개념이다. 부작위 정범과 공범의 구별에서 전형적·일반적 유형은 작위정범에 부작위로 가담하는 것이지만 이 분류기준을 부작위 상호간 가담시에 그대로 적용할 수는 없으므로 별도기준을 제시할 수 있어야 한다. 부작위범죄든 작위범죄든 결과적으로 응보의 형태로 형벌이 실행된다는 점에서는 동일하지만 그 목적이 응징에 있어서는 안 될 것이다. 사회 및 사회구성원 나아가서는 유죄판결을 받은 범죄자들의 인권까지도 보호하기 위한 차원에 형법의 목적이 있다. 부작위범에 있어서 정범과 공범을 구별하는 이유는 어떻게 해서든 형이 무거운 쪽으로 치우치지 않게 해주기 위함이다. 작위가 아님에도 불구하고 이를 처벌하려 한다면 처벌요건을 엄격하게 할 필요가 있으며 부작위정범으로 의율될 상황들도 가벌성을 낮춰주기 위해서 부작위방조로 될 수 있는지 판단해보아야 한다.

In the aspect of the Omission, often the most typical and common type of distinction between the principal offender and the accomplice is the type that the accomplices take part in the situation which the principal offender is already acting. It is not possible to apply this classification criterion of active offense to the circumstance of omission, as it is when the offense is taken as an omission. The possibility of distinction between the principal offender and accomplice is very important in legal practice and in the field of criminal legal theory. There has been a lack of dissertations or other criminal law literatures on the omission and the distinction between the principal offender and the accomplice to-date as only a few legal scholars and jurists have researched on this subject. The grounds of punishing crimes by omission should be clarified. Where the grounds for penalties for offenders are unclear, the punishment for offenders should be reduced. There is also a lack of literature in Germany or Japan on this subject. Although there have been many studies on the distinction between the principal offender and the accomplice in the active offense, the study on the distinction between the principal offender and the accomplice in the case of the omission has not been very long. And furthermore, there is also little data. It is probably because omission is invisible. However, in reality, omission is being punished in many countries. Only a few countries do not punish omission. In this dissertation, the main themes and analyses are the distinction between the principal offender and the accomplice and the possibility of the establishment of the joint principal offenders. In the meanwhile, I deal with the duty offender theory-not the dominated committed theory-with the theory of the omission and concentrated to analyze the relation between the duty offender and the omission. In conclusion, I suggest the theory of the intensity of the duty as the main criteria of the distinction between the principal offender and the accomplice, when the cases are among the omissions.