The problem of this research is correlate to the doing business report of 2020 in which minority shareholders’ rights in Qatar were assessed to be in a deteriorated position. The driving force of this deterioration is related to the power that controlling shareholders exert in curbing any development of an efficient minority shareholder remedy system. Controlling shareholders are prevalent in publicly held companies on the Qatar Stock Exchange. Their presence shifts the agency problem from one of agent-principal agency to one of principal-principal agency. This article highlights the inefficiency of the substantive and procedural rules for the company liability actions available to shareholders. It argues that company liability actions have been designed to foster controlling shareholders’ immunity against future claims. This is dysfunctional for minority shareholders rights for the mechanics of the claim to have been designed for the sole use of controlling shareholders. This study adopts the comparison methodology between Qatar and the UK legal system. The comparison of two legal system strives to articulates the resemblance of the Qatari claim to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, where the proper claimants are not the shareholders but the company. As a result, the minority are at the mercy of the controlling shareholders who have the cash flow and voting rights to steer general meeting outcomes. The findings of this study revels that article 115 of Qatar Companies Law need urgent major amendments. The article suggests the repeal of article 15 of Qatari companies law and the transplantation of prima facie threshold in the UK legal system to Qatar’s civil system.