Using the accruals quality measure developed by Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005), we investigate how accruals quality is related to managers’ choice on the type of voluntary disclosure under Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in Korea. Several studies theoretically demonstrate a substitutive relation between accruals quality and voluntary disclosure, suggesting that poor accruals quality, as a proxy for high information risk, causes managers to voluntarily disclose more information to mitigate the risk. On the contrary, other research supports a complementary relation between them. They maintain that market participants tend to put less credibility on the information with poor accruals quality and managers are supposed to be reluctant to disclose such information. Extant research regarding the relation between accruals quality and voluntary disclosure has conflicting arguments, which could be resulted from the ignorance of disclosure types. Managers may have different incentives depending on the degree of accruals quality in the decision-making process as to which type of disclosure to choose. However, there is little empirical evidence to observe whether accruals quality is associated with managers’ decision on disclosure types. To test this prediction, we classify Reg FD disclosures into earnings-related and nonearnings-related disclosures and examine the relation between accruals quality and disclosure contents, respectively. We find that accruals quality is positively associated with frequency of earnings-related voluntary disclosure while it is negatively associated with that of nonearnings-related voluntary disclosure. This result suggests that managers with good (poor) accruals quality decide to release more earnings- related (nonearnings-related) information to respond to investors who regard accruals information as more (less) credible. In addition, we also find that the effect of the relation is more pronounced in innate accruals quality rather than discretionary accruals quality. This result suggests that managers are more responsive to an innate component rather than a discretionary component of accruals quality in conveying more information to a capital market. Our results contribute to the extant literature by providing further evidence on whether accruals quality affects managers’ disclosure behavior. The motives for voluntary disclosure may depend on disclosure contents. This paper has a contribution in that it attempts to examine disclosure decision-making from the perspective of accruals quality.