Since 2012, China’ assertive policy toward the South China Sea dispute has led to increasing geopolitical competition that affects one of the most important trading routes. To engage with the South China Sea dispute, the EU, however, faces sets of hardly compatible roles, which would be either an offshore player or an onshore fighter, either a soft-power influencer or a hard-power enforcer. Despite ambitions to be a global maritime security provider, the EU is restrained by the division of Member States and thus, has to adopt an offshore position strategically. The EU, on the one hand, expresses disapproval of China’s policy without shaking the overall EU-China strategic partnership and on the other hand, prioritizes security and defense cooperation with other claimants and extra-regional stakeholders without building any formal alliances. Instrumentally, this article specifically sheds light on the EU’s diplomatic instruments, the role of the French navy and European arms sales to Southeast Asia. China’s opposition to internationalize the South China Sea dispute and its following countermeasures offset the EU’s diplomatic approach. Accordingly, the EU is developing coercive measures to promote its visibility in the South China Sea.