본 연구는 이사회의 감시위원회 설치와 구성이 기업의 위험추구행태에 미치는 효과를 실증적으로 확인한다. 분석결과, 감시위원회의 설치를 통해 강력한 감시기능이 수행되는 경우 기업의 위험추구행태가 강화되고, 투자지출이 확대되는 것으로 확인되었다. 또한 감시위원회내 다수의 사외이사가 활동하는 경우에도 동일한 효과를 관찰할 수 있었다. 이는 동 위원회가 경영자의 위험회피유인에 기초한 현실안주(entrenchment) 행태를 규율하는 방식으로 작동하고 있음을 시사한다. 한편, 투자지출이 기업가치를 개선시키는 효과는 감시위원회가 설치된 경우 더욱 강화되어 이러한 규율효과가 실질적으로 주주가치 개선에 연관될 수 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 더불어, 이러한 현상은 지배주주 지분율이 높아 현실안주 유인이 큰 기업에서 보다 강하게 관찰되어 앞선 가설이 보다 명료히 지지될 수 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 이상의 결과들은 이사회의 감시위원회를 통한 경영자 규율의 경로와 효과를 제시하는 측면에서 학술적, 실무적 시사점을 가질 것으로 판단된다.

This study empirically confirms the effect of the installation and structure of monitoring committees in the board of directors’ on the corporate risk-taking behaviors in Korean capital markets. Monitoring committees in the board are regarded as the efficient control mechanisms to mitigate the agency problem of managers. Especially in Korea, where external control mechanisms such as market for corporate control or managerial labor market are not fully developed, every time discussions on the improvement of corporate governance were raised, policy and practical attention was focused on the monitoring committees. As from the viewpoint of agent theory, agency problem, such as managers’ incentive to pursue the private benefit of control, is closely related to their risk-taking behaviors, understanding whether the monitoring committees discipline such incentive would be essential to establish an effective internal control mechanism to maximize shareholder value. For example, as the main cause of the Asian economic crisis, it has been pointed out that the indiscriminate expansion of business to expand the discretion (or control rights) of controlling shareholders, who have de facto control rights of the firm. Under the classical agency theory, such indiscreet expansion is explained by excessive risk-taking behaviors. On the contrary, excessive risk aversion may also be a problem. Recently, there is a growing argument that it is difficult to find a breakthrough in the national economy that has entered the low growth stage due to Korean companies’ passive investment propensity as well as low dividend payout and high cash-holdings. This risk-aversion behavior is based on managers’ entrenchment incentives to avoid liability for investment failures and to maintain their position stably. The main results of this study are as follows. First, if the monitoring committees are established in the board of directors, or if the number and roles of outside directors in the monitoring committees are expanded so that the monitoring functions are actively carried out, the risk seeking behavior of the firm is strengthened. This suggests that the monitoring board is working to eliminate the incentive for managerial entrenchment and to pursue risk to increase shareholders' monetary compensation through profit growth. In particular, it is noteworthy that the findings of previous papers in U.S. that the excessive monitoring by the monitoring committees can be an obstacle to the company's aggressive management strategy, is not supported in Korea. This result reaffirms the importance of the monitoring function of the board in the Korean capital market. The results of this paper were also observed when various alternative statistical models were used to confirm the robustness. In addition, this paper find that the establishment and composition of the monitoring committees has the effect of expanding investment expenditure, so it can be confirmed that the risk seeking behavior can be linked to the actual management decision makings. Meanwhile, the effect of investment spending on improving corporate value was more strongly observed in companies with monitoring committees. It confirms the disciplinary effect of monitoring committees once again, and suggests that the monitoring function of the monitoring committees contributes to the improvement of shareholder value, which is the ultimate goal of the company. The effect was strongly observed in companies with more managerial entrenchment incentives where controlling shareholders’ ownership exceeded 50%. This can be interpreted as a clear result of the inference of this study that the monitoring function of the monitoring committees is to alleviate the phenomenon of managerial entrenchment based on risk aversion incentives. The results of this study have the political implication: as the effectiveness of the monitoring committees has been confirmed, it may be necessary to refine the regulations on the committees as a management control device of the Korean capital market. Since the Asian economic crisis, regulations on the introduction of the audit committee and the outside director recommendation committee have been introduced, but they have not yet been extended to all listed companies. If the monitoring committee regulations are applied more broadly, it will contribute to encourage Korean companies with low dividend payout ratio and high cash holdings to seek active investment opportunities under the low growth trend. The results of this study also have the academic implication: this paper identifies how the benefits and costs of the board of directors found in the U.S. can be different in emerging economies where inefficiencies of market discipline measures are frequently observed. This paper also shows through which path the internal control mechanisms discipline managers effectively.