Organizational transparency in the public sector is a major concern in the public administration discourse. Conventional wisdom says that absence of transparency stimulates corruption. Therefore, transparency is argued to remedy this problem of corruption in the public sector organizations. Moreover, citizens demand accounts of their tax money. They want to be sure that the tax money is spent in a transparent manner. Therefore, governments around the world are giving legal basis to their transparency mechanism through enactment of transparency laws often known as freedom of information act (FOIA) or right to information act (RTIA). Access to information is a popular demand which is being considered as a fundamental democratic right. Transparency laws require public sector organizations to take some steps towards disclosure of government-held information for public scrutiny. According to the principal-agent theory, disclosure of information reduces the information asymmetry that exists between the principal (the citizens) and the agents (government organizations), and the principal, thereby, can hold the agents accountable. Ironically, functions of these public sector organizations are influenced by some organizational factors - like bureaucratic culture, organizational structure, and organizational endowment - which are less likely to be supportive of transparency behavior. How these organizational factors affect organizational transparency behavior, particularly in the street-level bureaucracy where discretion is high and resources are limited, becomes a major question which is still unanswered in the public administration literature? This paper addresses this question through an empirical study conducted in the street-level bureaucracy in Bangladesh.