In this paper, we examine the value of politically connected outside directors (PCODs) in Korea. To shed light on the debate surrounding the value of having PCODs join boards, we manually collect and construct a large sample of PCODs in Korean Chaebol firms. Broadly consistent with Goldman et al. (2009), we find some evidence that the number of PCODs are positively correlated with firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s Q and ROA. Furthermore, we find that the value effect of PCODs increases with the importance of internal trade among group affiliates, the existence of inside directorship by controlling shareholders, and a potential amount of settlement from pending litigation. We further differentiate among PCODs and find that former government officials as PCODs drive the findings above. On the other hand, we find evidence of weak monitoring ability of PCODs, in which the number of PCODs in a firm is negatively correlated with pay-for-performance sensitivity for inside executive directors, while we find no evidence that PCODs are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.