본 논문은 중앙은행의 금리결정이 기대경로를 거쳐 일반대중에게 어떻게 영향을 미칠 수 있는지 밝히고자 그 첫 번째 단계로서 중앙은행의 의사결정 행태가 미디어의 금리결정 보도에 어떻게 영향을 주는지를 분석했다. 분석 결과 금통위의 기준금리 변경(인상 및 인하) 결정은 동결에 비해 미디어의 금리정책 관련 보도분량을 유의하게 늘림을 확인할 수 있었다. 또 시장의 예상과 다르게 금리를 변경하는 경우의 충격효과는 금리인상의 경우와 인하의 경우에 비대칭적으로 나타났다. 즉, 충격적 금리인상은 예상된 금리인상에 비해 미디어의 주목을 오히려 덜 받았으나 충격적 금리인하는 예상된 인하에 비해 주목을 더 받았다. 또 한은 총재의 성향이 금리결정 보도에 미치는 영향을 알아보기 위해 넣은 총재 더미변수의 경우에는 이성태 총재와 김중수 총재 변수의 계수가 유의하게 양의 값을 가짐을 알 수 있었다. 이러한 결과들은 금융위기를 감안해도 변하지 않았다. 이 논문의 분석에서 도출할 수 있는 시사점은, 첫째, 미디어를 통한 금리결정의 공시효과는 목표금리를 동결할 때에 비해 변경시킬 때 훨씬 크고, 둘째, 시장의 예상과 다른 결정을 내림으로써 미디어를 통해 의도적으로 ‘충격효과’를 추구하는 것은 금리인상 때에는 효율적이지 않으며, 셋째, 총재의 커뮤니케이션 노력 그 자체가 미디어 및 대중의 기대형성에 영향을 줄 가능성이 존재한다는 것이다.

In this paper we analyze how BOK (the Bank of Korea)`s Base Rate decisions affect media`s attention to news on interest rate policy. This reveals one of the expectations channels through which policy decisions of central banks are transmitted to general public. Main results are that the BOK MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) `s decisions to raise or lower the Base Rate significantly increase the amount of news on monetary policy compared with the case where the rate is not changed. These results mean that changing the Base Rate itself is one of the effective BOK`s signal tools to affect expectations of general public. Moreover, unanticipated decisions that are contrary to the market expectations, have asymmetric ``surprise effects`` on media`s attention depending on the direction of rate change. Namely, unanticipated rate hikes receive fewer attention than anticipated ones, while unanticipated rate cuts receive more attention than anticipated ones. These results imply that unexpected rate hikes are less effective in transmitting BOK`s signal to general public than expected ones where BOK gives enough signals in advance. However, unexpected rate cuts do have surprise effects. In the case of Governor dummies, which are supposed to reflect the effect of each governor`s personality, Governor Kim Choongsoo`s and Governor Lee Seongtae`s dummies showed statistically significant positive values. These results are robust to the exclusion of the global financial crisis period. Policy implications from the analyses are as follows. First, the announcement effect of the Base Rate decisions through the media is larger when the BOK MPC changes the Base Rate than freezes it. Therefore, the BOK needs to consider decisions to change the Base Rate as one of strong transmission tools of monetary policy messages. Second, the BOK`s intention to seek ``surprise effects`` through the media by making decisions contrary to the market expectations is not efficient in the case of Base Rate hikes. Therefore, in the case of the Base Rate hikes the BOK should not seek surprise effects. Instead, the BOK could give enough signals to general public to prepare the Base Rate hikes. However, when the BOK cuts the Base Rate, it could consider t ouse surprise effects to give general public more information on future monetary policies by increasing the amount of news. Third, the Governor`s communication efforts may play some role to form expectations of media and general public. Therefore, the BOK Governor needs to make communication strategies and effectively disperse information on decisions on the Base Rate and their background to general public. The Governor could also use various policy measures such as press conferences, and media communication as communication tools.