본 연구에서는 외국인주주의 지분율이 기업의 투자효율성에 미치는 영향을 조사하였다. 연구 분석 결과 외국인주주의 지분율이 높을수록 기업의 과잉투자 성향과 다음 기 투자 간에 음(-)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 반대로, 외국인주주의 지분율이 높을수록 기업의 과소투자 성향과 다음 기 투자 간에는 양(+)의 관계가 보고되었다. 이는 외국인주주의 지분율이 높을수록 기업의 과잉(과소)투자가 감소함을 의미하는 것으로 외국인주주가 경영자의 투자의사결정을 모니터링하여 기업의 투자효율성을 증진시키는 역할을 하고 있는 것으로 해석될 수 있다. 다음으로, 기업의 지배구조에 따라 외국인주주의 역할에 차이가 있는지를 조사하기 위하여 표본을 재벌기업과 비재벌기업으로 구분하여 외국인주주의 지분율과 기업의 투자효율성간의 관계를 살펴 본 결과, 외국인주주의 투자효율성 증대 역할은 비재벌기업에 한정된 것으로 나타났다. 한편, 투자를 자본지출과 R&D지출로 구분하여 분석한 결과는, 외국인주주의 지분율은 자본지출의 효율성과 유의한 관계가 있으나 R&D지출의 효율성과는 유의한 관계가 없는 것으로 나타났다. 종합하면, 본 연구의 결과는 외국인주주는 기업의 투자효율성에 긍정적인 영향을 미치고 있으나, 그 영향은 기업지배구조에 따라 차이가 있음을 보여주고 있다. 본 연구를 통해 외국인주주가 경영자의 다양한 의사결정에 미치는 영향에 대한 이해를 보다 풍부하게 할 수 있다. 또한 기업의 투자효율성을 측정함에 있어서 Biddle et al.(2009)의 측정법을 이용하여 과잉(과소)투자에 미치는 영향을 각각 조사함으로 해서 외국인주주의 지분율 및 기업의 지배구조가 경영자의 투자의사결정에 미치는 영향을 살펴볼 수 있었다. 마지막으로, 실무에서는 외국인주주의 지분율이 기업의 투자효율성에 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 점을 인지하여, 투자결정을 해야 함을 시사한다.

This study examines the relationship between foreign ownership and investment efficiency. Following Biddle et al.(2009), investment efficiency is defined as the reduction in over- or under-investment. First, we investigate whether foreign ownership reduces over- or under-investment. Next, we further investigate whether the effect of foreign ownership on investment efficiency is alleviated in chaebol firms because chaebol firms have different business environment compared to the non-chaebol firm. Foreign ownership has dramatically increased since the stock market opened to foreign investors in the late 1992. For example, foreign ownership in 2001 is 32.75% based on market capitalization, and goes up to 43.92% in 2003. Although it has decreased to 27.22% in 2008 because of the global recession, it has recovered to 30.56% in 2011. Consequently, foreign investors exert significant influence on Korean capital market and individual firm`s business decisions. However, there is a concern over the weakening growth potential caused by the investment strategy of the foreign investors. For example, it became extremely common for practitioners and academics to argue that foreign investors destabilize emerging market economies pursuing short term incentive and high dividend policy. Following pecking order theory, firms prefer internal reserves to external financing when they to the investment and operating activities. Therefore, increased dividend payout can lead to decreased investment, and many studies have been done to figure out the effect of foreign investors on firm`s dividend policy and investment decision(Park 2004; Lee and Rho 2006; Park and Lee 2006; Sul and Kim 2006; Kang and Min 2010). However, the results are mixed, and it need to accumulate more empirical evidence on this issue. In addition, while the prior studies have examined whether the foreign investors affect firm`s investment level, there is no study that examines the effect of foreign investors in terms of investment efficiency which is defined as a reduction in over- or under- investment. Therefore, we provide additional evidence on the association between the foreign ownership and firm`s investment activities focusing on investment efficiency. Another difference between this study from the prior literature is that we examine the issue from the perspective of the monitoring role of foreign investors rather than pecking order theory. Many empirical evidences have shown that foreign investors play a positive role in accounting quality and corporate governance (Cheon 2003; Rho et al. 2003; Ahn et al. 2005; Oh and Sohn 2006; Kim and Kim 2007; Kim et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2008; Chun et al. 2011). That is, foreign investors monitor and discipline the firm(Cheon 2003), and consequently firms` investment and operating decisions can be enhanced as well. Therefore, we predict that foreign ownership has positive association with investment efficiency. Next, this study investigates whether the association between foreign ownership and investment efficiency is different between chaebol firm and non-chaebol firm. There is controversy over the pros and cons of the chaebol. While group-affiliated firms benefit from group membership (Chang and Hong 2000: Bae and Jeong 2007), they are also widely blamed for the opportunistic behavior. Specifically, the complex structure of chaebol encourages self-dealing transaction and makes it difficult for outside investors to monitor these transactions(Kim and Yi 2010). Especially, the problem is enlarged when there exist large wedge between control (voting rights) and ownership (cash flow rights) of controlling shareholders. Therefore, we predict that the association between foreign ownership and investment efficiency is weakened in chaebol firm sample. Our sample consists of 3,075 firm-year observations for the period 2002-2008. All firms are listed on the KSE. Using this sample, we find a conditional negative(positive) association between foreign ownership and investment for firms operating in settings more prone to over-investment(under-investment). Interestingly, the results was significant only for capital expenditure, and not for R&D expenditure. Second, we find that the above relationship is shown only in non-chaebol sample. These results suggest that foreign ownership helps efficient investment, but it can be limited according to the type of investment and corporate governance. In addition, the result was not altered after controlling for accounting quality in the model. This study sheds light on the literature that examines the effect of foreign investors on firms` decisions. In addition, we can measure firms` investment efficiency using Biddle et al.(2009) that defines it as a reduction in over- or under- investment. Lastly, The result of this study has implications to practitioners and academics on the role of foreign investors and investment decision.