1930년대의 대공황과 현재 진행되고 있는 세계금융위기 그리고 이어진 글로벌 재정위기는 경기변동의 일반적인 패턴을 보여준다. 그것은 경기변동은 정부의 통화량 조작과 신용팽창에서 비롯되며 그 과정은 붐(boom)과 버스트(bust)로 진행된다는 것이다. 현재의 글로벌 재정위기의 원인은 이런 패턴 속에서 찾을 수 있다. 글로벌 재정위기는 가깝게는 금융위기를 극복하기 위하여 은행 시스템에 제공되는 대규모 구제 금융과 경기부양책에서 비롯된다. 그러나 그것의 근본적인 원인은 금융위기를 초래하는 통화 및 신용의 팽창정책에 있다. 남 유럽 국가들의 재정위기 사태에는 여기에다 유럽통화연맹(EMU)의 경제질서와 지나친 복지 정책도 그것의 원인이다. EMU의 경제질서는 회원 국가들로 하여금 재정정책만 시행할 수 있게 하지 개별적인 통화정책은 구사하지 못하게 한다. 이것은 남유럽 국가들의 정부와 민간 부문들에게 도덕적 해이를 초래하여 단일 화폐인 유로라는 ``공유지의 비극(tragedy of commons)``의 현상을 가져왔다. 이것이 경상수지의 적자와 국가부채의 증대로 이어지게 했다. 글로벌 금융위기 후 미국을 비롯한 유럽 국가들은 대규모 경기부양책을 실시하였고 금융 위기를 초래한 통화 팽창정책을 다시 실시하였다. 그러나 그것의 경기부양 효과는 미미하였으며 금융위기를 초래한 원인은 도려내지지 않은 상태로 여전히 남아 있을 뿐이다. 위기를 모면하기 위해 실시되는 통화 팽창정책과 확장적인 재정정책은 또 다른 위기의 불씨가 될 가능성이 높다. 남유럽 국가들의 재정위기는 여기에다 EMU 경제질서의 개혁이라는 숙제를 남기고 있다. 그것은 회원국들의 통화정책에 이은 재정정책의 대 통합으로 나아갈 것을 요구 한다.

We find important policy implications from the analysis of the recent global fiscal crisis sparked by the collapse of the bubble in the U.S. housing market. One concerns the business cycle and the other concerns the economic order of the EMU. Policy implications of the business cycle are as follows: (1) Recent business cycles including the Great Depression of the 1930s show us a general pattern in that all result from the expansionary monetary policy. This is different from the business fluctuation inherent in the market economy. (2) The business cycle proceeds with boom followed by burst. The boom formed by the expansionary monetary policy forces monetary authorities to tighten their money supply. This reveals false investments, leading to the burst of the boom. The banking system would sustain a severe blow due to the bankruptcy of firms. (3) The government supports the banking system with huge relief funds and carries out stimulus fiscal programmes to promote economic recovery. This rapidly worsens the government`s fiscal situation. An accumulation of excessive social welfare spendings also is another factor that causes a fiscal crisis. (4) People of the country in fiscal crisis will not tolerate the infliction that comes unavoidably in the process of bursting. They ask the government for strong stimulus fiscal measures and expansionary monetary policies in order not to burst the boom. Government deems it natural and necessary to intervene in the market with strong measures. (5) From the Great Depression of the 1930`s and other recent experiences, we learn, however, that such a strong measure of the government has only a temporary affect similar to a pain reliever. The causes of the problem are not cut away, still hiding deep within the economy, and bud into another crisis. (6) Absent of interest and monetary manipulation, there can be no tendency for entrepreneurs to make systemic errors that can create economy-wide booms followed by bursts. (7) If a country that undergoes a fiscal crisis has not sufficient foreign exchange reserves resulted from the chronic current account deficits, other countries or institutions will not be willing to purchaseits bonds. As it is not easy to roll-over maturing bonds, this country is then downgraded to junk status by major credit rating agencies and driven to a crisis of national default. The economic order of EMU (European Monetary Union) is another factor of the fiscal crisis of PIIGS countries. Policy implications of EMU are as follows: (1) In order to allocate resources efficiently, institutions which configure an economic order are to be composed in harmony, without conflicting with each other. However, EMU`s economic order does not perform this function. This is owing to the fact that EMU was established for more political reasons than economic. EMU member countries are under the ECB (Economic Central Bank)`s single monetary policy, but each member can enforce its own fiscal policy. Therefore, all member states cannot have a consistent and harmonious fiscal and monetary system. Global financial crisis has served only to reveal the fatal defects of economic order inherent in EMU.(2) EMU was established in 1999, despite of significant differences in the economic environments and monetary policies between member countries. It has brought moral hazard to the governments and its people, the Southern European members in particular. The Euro is advantageous to these countries in that inflation would go on but it would be more hidden. They could enjoy more imports and overconsumption. Their moral hazard has led to such as a `tragedy of the commons` of a single currency euro. (3) In the system of EMU an individual country cannot implement her own monetary policy to cool an economic boom and to cope with the current account deficit. She can make such an effort only through fiscal policies of tax increases, the workforce reductions in public sector, pension cut, etc. The EMU blocks the way for the market to heal the misled price mechanism. (4) Unless the elements that can cause moral hazard in the economic order of EMU are not removed, a fiscal crisis such as now is bound to be repeated at any time. If they want to keep this system, major countries like Germany must support economically weaker countries. It`s very skeptical, however, if the German government and her people would support them in any case.