본 논문은 감사시장에서 초도감사의 감사품질과 초도감사시 감사보수가 할인된 경우 감사품질이 떨어지는 지를 연구하였다. 감사보수의 할인은 감사보수 결정모형에서 추정한 감사보수보다 일정비율이상 낮은 기업으로 정의하고, 감사품질은 재량적 발생액으로 측정하였다. 분석결과에 의하면, 첫째, 초도감사기업의 감사품질은 계속감사기업에 비하여 낮게 나타났고, 둘째, 초도감사 보수할인기업의 감사품질이 초도감사 보수비할인기업에 비하여 더욱 낮게 나타났다. 이는 초도감사기업의 감사품질이 낮을 뿐 아니라 보수할인 시에는 감사품질이 더욱 낮아진다는 것을 의미한다. 그동안 회계감독당국 및 한국공인회계사회에서는 초도감사 보수할인이 감사품질의 저하를 가져올 가능성에 대하여 심히 우려하고 있었다. 실증분석결과는 이러한 우려가 사실임을 보여주고 있다.

In Korea, listed companies have been required to retain the same auditor for three consecutive years under the mandatory auditor retention requirement as a means of increasing auditor independence since 1998. However, there has been growing concern that this requirement causes more serious price competition among auditors. In other words, auditors will compete among themselves in order to win over the initial year audit engagement by signi- ficantly cutting down the audit fee, since a guaranteed three consecutive years of audit engagement can be obtained under the auditor retention requirement. This price-cutting may cause the auditors to spend insufficient amount of hours on the audit engagement, which could threaten the quality of the audit. This study examines the impact of the initial audit fee discount on audit quality under the current mandatory auditor retention requirement for listed companies. The relation between the initial audit engagement, the initial audit fee discount, and the audit quality has been analyzed for listed companies covering the period from 1999 to 2003 based on the audit fee model and discretionary accruals; the companies offering an audit fee discount are defined as those having actual audit fees of at least 20% lower than the estimates calculated based on the audit fee model, and the audit quality was measured using discretionary accruals. The analysis revealed two main findings: first, the initial audit engagement provided a lower audit quality compared to the continuing audit even when the audit fee discount factor was disregarded; second, discretionary accruals of companies under initial audit with discounted fees were higher than that of companies with no discount, and even higher than that of companies in general. In short, the audit quality of the initial audit engagement is generally low and that of companies giving the initial audit fee discount is even lower; this could lead to an increase in the possibility of audit mal-practice. For many years, practitioners and regulators have been concerned about the possibility of the initial audit fee discount reducing the audit quality, and the findings from this study are consistent with the argument that audit quality may be compromised if the audit fee is not sufficient. Therefore, it is recommended that practitioners and regulators take adequate policies in preventing the audit quality from being impaired as a result of the initial audit fee discount.