북한의 핵외교를 중심으로 한 대미 외교는 약소국의 대강대국 강압외교라는 매우 독특한 외교전략 유형이다. 본 연구는 이를 선군외교로 명명하면서 이론적으로 설명하기 위해 가설수준의 선군외교 전략모델을 제시하였다. 이 모델은 북한이 미국의 군사위협을 억지하고 미국이 협상에 임하도록 강제해 내려는 일련의 실행전략 및 행동방식으로 구성되어 있다. 구체적으로는 악명 유지전략, 모호성유지전략, 벼랑끝전략, 맞대응전략, 위기관리전략, 협상전략의 체계로 이루어져 있으며, 이중 협상전략은 북미양자협상·포괄적 일괄타결·근본문제 카드 활용·단계별 동시행동이라는 행동방식으로 설명될 수 있다. 이어 이렇게 제시된 선군외교 전략모델을 제1·2차 북핵위기(1993-1994년/2002-2007년) 과정을 통하여 실제로 행해진 북한의 대미 전략행태와 일치하는 지를 확인함으로써 동 모델의 적실성을 검증하였다. 나아가 이 모델을 활용하여 두 차례에 걸친 북핵협상 과정에서 나타난 북한의 대미외교 전략의 작동원리 및 행태 등을 면밀히 분석하였고, 제1·2차 북핵위기 과정에서 북한이 보여준 차이점도 발견할 수 있었다.

This study attempts to create a theoretical strategy model about North Korea`s military-first diplomacy that was displayed during North Korea`s nuclear crisis and negotiation that followed. This model was verified by applying it to North Korea`s strategic behavior patterns during the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis. The following is the findings from the study. The military-first diplomacy, which is North Korea`s basic diplomatic strategy toward the US, is essentially the coercive diplomatic strategy represented by asymmetric deterrence and compellence. In other words, it can be defined as a kind of coercive strategy to develop and mobilize each and every military resource available, including asymmetrical weapons like nuclear arms and ballistic missiles, in order to deter the US threats against North Korea on the one hand, and to force the US to engage in diplomacy and negotiations with North Korea on improving relations on the other. In theoretical views, the military-first diplomacy is assessed to be a type of a non-conforming and confrontational diplomatic policy which small-weak states tend to employ against the powers when small-weak states approach powerful states to forge diplomatic ties without giving up their absolute autonomy. It is also a representative example of foreign policies "rogue states" employ in seeking to coexist with the hegemonic powers they are in conflict with. North Korea showed the same strategic pattern of behaviors in the process of diplomacy and negotiations with the US both during the first(Mar. 1993 - Oct. 1994) and second North Korean nuclear crisis(Oct. 2002- Feb. 2007), even though the latter came ten years after the former. This is the "asymmetric deterrent and compellent coercive diplomatic strategy" or the military-first diplomatic strategy. In the course of the nuclear crisis and negotiations, the military-first diplomacy was carried out by the sequential sub-process of implementation which consists of the strategies of the "Reputation effect and Keeping Obscurity → Brinkmanship → Tit for tat → Crisis management → North Korea-US bilateral negotiation → Comprehensive package deal → Fundamental issue card → Concurrent action by steps". In this paper, this strategic process is viewed as the basic working mechanism of the military-first diplomacy and is set as a theoretical model for military-first diplomatic strategy.