韓國經濟가 高度成長을 이룬 지난 30년 동안 政府의 政策은 經濟第一主義라 할만한 것이었으며 經濟政策은 市場機能에 대한 간섭이 매우 심한 것이었다. 이 때문에 韓國의 성경험을, 政府가 市場의 資源配分機能을 干涉 내지 代行함으로써 經濟成長을 促進시킬 수 있다는 命題를 지지하는 증거로 보는 견해가 널리 퍼져 있다. 이 견해가 옳은가의 여부에 따라 바람직한 政府의 역할은 크게 다르게 된다. 本稿는 政府에 의한 市場의 資源配分機能 干涉의 대표적인 예라 할 수 있는 1970년대의 重化學工業政策의 효과를 살펴보았다. 이를 위해, 製造業內의 韓國標準産業分類 3단위의 개별산업들에 관하여, 그리고 이들의 政策惠澤을 받은 産業群과 그 나머지로 나눈 두 産業群에 관하여, ① 資本集約度를 추계한 후 그 變化推移가 示唆하는 바를 살펴보고, ② 資本效率性을 추정하여 資源의 最適配分條件과 비교함으로써 政策의 成長에 대한 寄與를 평가하였고, ③OECD 盒員國 輸入 중 韓國輸出의 占有率을 臺灣과 비교함으로써 政策이 韓國輸出의 競爭力에 미친 영향을 저울질해 보았다. 政策惠澤을 받았던 重化學工業群에서는 1970년대 중반에 資本集約度가 빠르게 증가한 반면 輕工業群에서는 하락하거나 거의 증가하지 않았으며, 重化學工業群의 資本效率性은 1970년말까지 輕工業群에 비해 훨씬 낮았는데, 本稿는 이를 重化學工業에 대한 과잉투자의 결과라고 보았으며 重化學工業政策이 製造業의 성장을 지체시키는 효과가 있었음을 示唆하는 것이라고 보았다. OECD 輸出 중 韓國輸出의 占有率은 輕工業群에서 臺灣에 비해 더 컸으나 1970년대 중반 이후 오히려 작아졌고, 重化學工業群에서도 그 占有率이 臺灣에 비하요 점점 더 뒤떨어지게 되었다. 이 같은 競爭力의 相對的 弱化가 1980년대 중반까지 계속되었음에 비추어, 本稿는 重化學工業政策이 輸出競爭力을 提高하는 效果가 없었거나 혹은 오히려 떨어뜨리는 效果가 있었다고 보았다.

Korea`s rapid economic growth of the past thirty years was led by extremely fast export growth under extensive government intervention. Until very recently, the political regimes were authoritarian and oppressed human rights and labor movements. Because of these characteristics, many inside and outside Korea are under the impression that the rapid economic growth was made possible by the government`s relentless push for export growth through industrial targeting. Whether or not the government intervene-tion was pivotal in Korean economic growth is an important issue because of its nor-mative implications on the role of government and the degree of economic policy intervention in a market economy. A good example of industrial targeting policy in Korea is the "Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI)" policy, which began in the early 1970s and lasted for one decade. Under the HCI policy the government intervened in resource allocation through preferential tax, trade, and credit and interest rate policies for "key industries" which included iron and steel non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, general machinery, chemicals, and electronics. This paper investigates the effects of· the HCI policy on the efficiency of capital and the export competitiveness of manufacturing industries. For individual three-digit KSIC (Korea Standard Industrial Classification) industries and for two industry groups, one favored by HCI Policy and the other not, this paper: (1) computes capital intensities and discusses the impact of the HCI policy on the changes in the intensities over time, (2) estimates the capital efficiencies and examines them on the basis of optimal condition of resource allocation, and (3) compares the Korean and Taiwanese shares of total imports by the OECD countries as a way of weighing the effects of the policy on the industries` export competitiveness. Taiwan is a good reference, as it did not adopt the kind of industrial targeting policy that Korea did, while the Taiwanese and Korean economies share similar characteristics. In the 1973-78 period, the capital intensity rose rapidly for the "HC Group," the group of industries favored by the policy, while it first declined and later showed an anemic rise for the "Light Group," the remaining manufacturing industries. Capital effi-ciency was much lower in the HC Group than in the Light Group, at least until the late 1970s. This paper acribes these results to excess investments in the favored industries and concludes that growth could have been faster in the absence of the HCI policy. The Korean Light Group`s share in total imports by the OECD was larger than that of its Taiwanese counterpart but has become much smaller since 1978. For the HC Group Korea`s market share was smaller than Taiwan`s and has declined even more since the mid-1970s. This weakening in the export competitiveness of Korea`s industries relative to Taiwan`s lasted until the mid-1980s. This paper concludes that the HCI policy had either no positive effect on the competitiveness of the Korean manufacturing industries or negative effects.