Despite the explosive increase in the research program on government growth in recent years, little work has been done on government growth outside the United States and some advanced European countries. Futhermore, no attempt has been taken to explain government growth on subnational levels. I examine the empirical validity of some competing models of government growth for Korea: Wanger s Law, the International Explanation, the Supply-Side Explanation, the Bureau Voting Explanation, the Political Competition Explanation, the Inter-governmental Grant Explanation, and the Political Business Cycle. Government size is defined in terms of per capita government spending. The analysis uncovers strong empirical support for the International Explanation, the Bureau Voting Explanation. the Intergovernmental Grant Explanation, and the Political Business Cycle, moderate support for the Wagner s Law, and virtually no support for the Supply-Side Explanation and the Political Competition Explanation. These findings have important implications for the study of government growth in general, and more specifically, in the Korean local governments.